The Great Debate: Are Ukraine and the U.S. allies or not?

JB Note: Re the above cited piece (full text below), I was struck by the following section of the misnamed Newsweek article, Russia's Ukrainian Retreat:

The Kremlin is pressing for Ukraine to become a federation like Bosnia, which was divided at the 1995 Dayton Accords into a pro-Western Bosnian-Croat area and the Republika Srpska, backed by neighboring Serbia [JB - Russia following the USA's policy in the Balkans?]. Both are de facto autonomous states within a state with their presidents, parliaments and courts. Bosnia’s “central government, with its tripartite presidency and ethnically fractured parliament, [is] largely impotent,” says Brian Whitmore, author of the influential The Power Vertical blog. “Bosnia remains a dysfunctional state. And nearly a decade after [Slobodan] Milosevic’s death, Serbia continues to use Republika Srpska to paralyze and manipulate the country and cripple its efforts to join mainstream Europe.” Kiev would much prefer to see an arrangement akin to that of Srpska Krajina, an ethnic Serbian slice of Croatia that was given some initial autonomy after the war but was quickly reabsorbed into a united Croatia—which joined the European Union in 2012.

Some Ukrainians are already suspicious that the U.S. is keen to do a deal with Russia to carve up their country behind Kiev’s back. “FYI Ukraine doesn't need a new Dayton agreement which cemented Bosnia as an ever-failed state,” tweeted Ukrainian journalist Myroslava Petsa in response to the Kerry-Putin talks. “Was convenient for the West, not the Bosnians.” Both Washington and Moscow said the fate of the annexed Crimean Peninsula was not mentioned in the Sochi talks (nor is Crimea spoken of in either of the cease-fire agreements signed in Minsk by the EU, U.S. and Russia). Kerry had bigger concerns, such as securing Russian cooperation on an Iran deal and Syria.

FYI, in 2005 -- Having served in both Ukraine (93-95) and the the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (95-98) as a U.S. diplomat, I wrote a piece (2005), "Options for Ukraine," doubtless now politically incorrect regarding my suggestion that international "borders" are not necessarily eternal, as we Americans historically demonstrated when we seceded from the British Empire in 1776. The piece, granted, failed to foresee the development of a Ukrainian "nationalism" that resulted from recent aggressive Russian actions in eastern Ukraine. But, I would still say it (such "nationalism") stemmed, essentially, not from grass-roots support for a Ukrainian "unitary state," but from from an oppressed population's shared suspicion/hatred of chinovniki, no matter their nationality/language (an alienation of the oppressed from those in arbitrary power which can be traced back since at least Gogol, Ukrainian born but one of the greatest writers in the Russian language). However, at the risk of sounding like a Monday morning quarterback, I made the following observations over a decade ago that I hope today still have some validity, if only to contribute to a debate that may be framed as follows: "Ukraine and/or the Ukraine: What Next?"

The tense political situation in Ukraine [in 2005] may find a peaceful solution. But, at this critical juncture, efforts to maintain Ukraine as currently configured could turn out to be dangerously counterproductive. Ukraine should therefore seriously consider the option of working with all parties involved in its current crisis–including the European Union, Russia, and the United States–in taking possible steps toward its nonviolent dismemberment in a manner acceptable to its variegated population. The possibility of such a peaceful, democratic, and internationally acceptable geographical rearrangement of Ukraine should at least be put on the table before it is too late to prevent an unpredictable situation from falling out of control from increased regional, ethnic, economic, cultural, and linguistic conflicts.

The piece included the following observations:

There are two options for the next ruling party in Ukraine. The leadership–be it composed of the current opposition or those struggling to remain in power–can try to keep the country geographically as it is. Perhaps this is possible, and provides the comforting panacea of not rocking the boat, on the surface at least. But, from a longer-term perspective, preserving Ukraine as it is could increase tensions between its ethnic groups and regions, as demands for autonomy from Russian-speaking areas already suggest. Dangerously, maintaining Ukraine as one unit at all costs could lead to greater internal conflicts leading to a bloody, Balkans-like dissolution of the country–and possible Russian intervention ostensibly to protect ethnic-Russian areas. One must not forget that modern Ukraine is not foreign to civil war, having experienced a horrid one less than a hundred years ago. In such a situation, democratic and economic reform would be all but impossible. ...

If the tense political situation in Kiev gets worse and if the status quo–i.e., Ukraine as currently configured–is maintained, separatist political groups and nationalities could resort to violence. Given such dire possibilities, Ukrainian leaders should look beyond a priori concepts of how the continued existence of today’s Ukraine is in the best interests of its long-suffering population or international stability. All options, including the geopolitical reinvention of Ukraine itself, deserve consideration. This could lead to a real Ukraine – not the artificial prolongation of “the” Ukraine forced upon its people during Soviet times.

Another more recent piece on the Russia-Ukraine situation -- The Irony of Current Russian-Ukrainian Relations, in which I note:

I need not repeat summaries of the history of Soviet-created Ukraine; they are available (granted, through various interpretations, on the Internet). As for the immensely talented and cultivated people living in the former Ukraine SSR, they more than ever deserve global admiration for their unique achievements, given the political oppression they have endured for centuries under various empires (vampires?)/regimes. Gogol and Shevchenko didn't come out of nowhere.

In A Final Nail in the USSR Coffin? Thank You From NATO, Vladimir Vladimirovich!, it was noted in a Gogolian (realpolitik?) mood:

1. By acquiring an economic basket case, Crimea -- and perhaps planning to annex, in one form or another -- economically depressed/inefficient areas of eastern Ukraine, Vladimir Vladimirovich, child of the Cold War, is putting additional stress on an unproductive Russian economy that has not yet recovered from 70 years of communism. All this after billions of dollars wasted for the Sochi Olympics. ...

3. Western investors in Ukraine -- who today, I speculate, have no choice but to consider the country as unitary in order to deal with its government which, no matter how corrupt, they must cooperate with (bribe) to get things done -- would quickly lose interest in Russian-held places like Donetsk and Kharkov, Detroits of the former Soviet Empire.

4. Savvy profit-oriented Poles and Scandinavians -- who, unlike the EU chinovniki, have real economic/historical interests (rather than bureaucratic ones) -- in an entity so close to their borders, would put more of their money in western Ukraine, which is more adaptable to the 21st-century economy than an eastern economic rust belt under Russian influence. So eastern Ukraine would, economically, lose out, as no way the Russian state has the resources significantly to invest in that part of its "space."

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blogs.reuters.com; via https://www.facebook.com/Kennan.Institute?fref=ts
By Matthew Rojansky, Thomas E. Graham and Michael Kofman June 10, 2015

President Barack Obama shakes hands with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, September 18, 2014. REUTERS/Larry Downing

At this critical moment for the future of Ukrainian, European and U.S. interests in the region, the U.S.-Ukraine strategic partnership lacks both strategy and partnership.

This much is clear after meetings with Ukraine’s political leaders, journalists, academics, civil-society activists and volunteers active in the conflict zone during our recent trip across the beleaguered nation. Ukraine’s appeals for U.S. support have only grown louder and more desperate as renewed fighting flared around Donetsk in the past week.

Washington and Kiev have reached the limits of what political rhetoric, summitry and symbolism can achieve. Both must now identify the vital national interests that can build and sustain a partnership between the two countries for the foreseeable future. If they don’t, the two nations risk continuing a relationship that will disappoint and ultimately alienate Americans and Ukrainians alike.

President Barack Obama meets with Ukraine President-elect Petro Poroshenko in Warsaw, June 4, 2014. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

Ukraine has already transformed in crucial ways since the Maidan demonstrations in 2013-14. It is on a path leading away from its Soviet and post-Soviet legacies. Yet its course toward a Western European alliance is not yet open or irreversible.

Ukraine’s future will be shaped by reform-minded political leaders and an awakened civil society. But also by longstanding, powerful oligarchic interests and pervasive corruption. Reforms have been sluggish, to the dissatisfaction of many, including the ruling political coalition.

Each attempted reform reveals the need to fix other components of governance, the political system or the economy. Positive effects are slow to be felt and public patience wanes.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and occupation of the Donbas have altered both Ukraine’s delicate domestic regional power balances and the relative equilibrium among the country’s most powerful oligarchs. Part of the country grows tired and angry from the grinding reality of war, while another part seems oblivious to it.

Many Ukrainians we spoke to repeatedly said they have little confidence that the current constellation of political leaders can deliver on promises they have made at home and abroad. Even many people in the government cautioned against framing U.S.-Ukraine relations in terms of support for one or several domestic political forces and their agenda. Doing so, they said, could draw Washington into a byzantine game, in which oligarchic power-brokers hold most of the cards, and in which the doors would stand wide open to these same Ukrainian actors seeking to play for influence in U.S. domestic politics — an unhealthy development by any measure.

For more than a quarter century, the United States has supported Ukraine based on shared values and interests. But official Washington is now deeply vested in the success of the new Kiev government formed after the 2014 elections; senior U.S. officials have called their Ukrainian counterparts “courageous” and “inspiring.” So Washington has little leverage on the Ukrainian leadership to follow through on specific policy reforms.

Under these circumstances, politicians and parties, their oligarch backers and many new civic groups all seek U.S. support and close ties with Washington. It is beginning to resemble an emerging client-state relationship in search of reliable patronage. This is hardly the relationship the Ukrainian and American people want. But in the absence of a strategic vision and a framework for strategic partnership, it is likely what both could end up with.

To avoid this, much can be done. First, Washington should endorse Kiev’s leading political figures and their agenda with the same degree of caution and circumspection as the Ukrainian people support them. Washington must stop believing that it can be an active player in Ukrainian politics to achieve a desired change.

Instead, the U.S. objective should be to work on the overarching problems that create instability and threaten Ukraine’s future: the disastrous state of the economy and the conflict with Russia. Both are vexing and beyond the capability of the Ukrainian state — under any leadership — to solve by itself.

Next, Washington should work with Kiev to lay the framework for a bilateral strategic partnership. This should be based on a clear definition of mutual interests and values, and realistic expectations for the short, middle and long term.

Instead of a few favored partners or signature projects in Ukraine, Washington should look for spheres of cooperation that serve the interests of both nations. It must forget the tired formula of persuading Ukrainians to pick a pro-Western path as a vehicle for foiling Russian-led integration projects. A new approach can build a foundation for sustained bilateral engagement with Ukraine as a whole — well beyond the period after the fighting with Russia has ended. As it eventually will.

Finally, Washington must demonstrate strategic patience. Ukraine will likely progress more slowly and more fitfully than Americans would prefer. A strategic partnership based on clearly defined values and interests will help both sides navigate the potential misunderstandings and significant challenges that lie ahead.