JOSEPH S. NYE JR. Politico
JB: Pretty thin gruel; see also.
America's global leadership won't dissipate as quickly as its loudest Cassandras have warned.
America's global leadership won't dissipate as quickly as its loudest Cassandras have warned.
You’d be forgiven for thinking that the American century was already over. Most people around the world think it is — including most Americans. In recent years, polls showed that in 15 of 22 countries surveyed, most respondents said China either will replace or has replaced the United States as the world’s leading power. A Pew poll in 2014 found only 28 percent of Americans thought their country “stands above all others.” For the first time in nearly 40 years a majority of the American public said the United States plays a less important and powerful role as a world leader than it did a decade ago.
But a closer look at our country’s recent past — and our future — makes clear that the nation was never quite as powerful as its biggest boosters have claimed, nor, though, will its global leadership dissipate in the years ahead as quickly as its loudest Cassandras have warned.
The very idea of “the American century” has always been somewhat arbitrary. The term was coined early in 1941 by Henry Luce, the famed publisher of Time magazine, as a political slogan in the domestic battle to reverse the isolationism of the period and press the United States to enter World War II. At the time, we were the world’s largest power, but we did not act like one. The 19th century was often seen as “the British century,” and Luce’s idea of the “American century” was meant to capture the nation’s attention to its power and global leadership — and set up a clear contrast with Britain’s weakening state.
There has always been something odd about our fascination with centuries. How does such a time measurement apply to the life cycle of a country? Political entities are social constructs without clear life spans. Rome started its rise to power in the pre-Christian era and reached its apogee in 117 AD, but the Western Roman empire did not collapse until some 3½ centuries later, and the Eastern Roman empire persisted until 1453.
Despite such problems, some analysts and historians have tried to discern century-long patterns in the life cycles of dominant countries. It’s always been hard to predict what’s right around the corner. For example, after Britain lost its North American colonies in the 18th century, the statesman Horace Walpole lamented that Britain was now reduced to the status of a miserable little island like Sardinia. He uttered this erroneous judgment on the eve of Britain’s “second century,” ushered in by the Industrial Revolution.
How should we measure the American century? If one defines it as the period since the U.S. became the country with the largest economy, it roughly coincides with the 20th century, reaching its peak in mid-century, and it is likely to end in the next decade or so when analysts expect China to pass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy. But that’s not necessarily a good measurement of geopolitical success. Power — the ability to affect others to get what you want — has three aspects: coercion, payment and attraction. Economic might is just part of the geopolitical equation. Even when China passes the U.S. in total economic size, which measured at exchange rates some economists think may occur in the late 2020s, we will not automatically be witnessing the end of the American century. Even in economic power China will still lag in per capita income, a better measure of the sophistication of an economy.
Michael Lind believes the American century began in 1914 with our entry into World War I, and he argues that it ended in 2014 because America’s foreign policy is in a state of collapse, America’s economy doesn’t work well and American democracy is broken. It is more accurate, however, to date the American century with the end of World War II. After the war, when Britain was too weak to support Greece and Turkey in 1947, the U.S. stepped up and took its place — investing in the Marshall Plan in 1948, creating NATO in 1949 and leading a United Nations coalition that fought in Korea in 1950.
Some might say that 1991 is a third potential mark for the beginning of the American century — the date when, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became the world’s only country able to project military power on a global scale. The American Navy was equal in size to the next 17 navies; American forces had air superiority; the United States took the lead in space and the dawn of cyberspace; and the American military budget represented nearly half the globe’s total defense spending. In such circumstances, it became very difficult for other states to balance American power. But that is too short a perspective.
There has always been a lot of fiction mixed with the facts of the “American century.” To borrow a comedian’s line, “Hegemony ain’t what it used to be, but then it never was.” The United States had a terrific run after World War II, but we never built a truly global order. The American world order has never represented more than half the globe; our system didn’t include large countries like China, India, Indonesia and the Soviet bloc. The peak of America’s share of world power resources was from 1945 — when the U.S. had nearly half the world economy — to 1970, when the U.S. share of world product returned to its pre-war level of a quarter of the world product. Yet even during this period of peak influence, the U.S. often failed to get what it wanted: Witness Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons; communist takeover of China and half of Vietnam; stalemate in the Korean War; Soviet suppression of the revolts in Hungary and Czechoslovakia; Castro’s control of Cuba; and so forth.
So if we define “the American century” as the period since World War II when the United States — without full control — became the central actor in the global balance of power, will those same geopolitical circumstances still be true in 2041? My guess is yes. The U.S. is the only major developed country that will hold its place (third) in the demographic ranking of countries, rather than shrinking in population or being overtaken by other countries. Its dependence on imported energy has decreased; it remains in the forefront in development of key technologies (bio, nano, information) that are central to this century’s economic growth; American universities dominate in the area of higher education; and our culture remains open and entrepreneurial. It’s going to take years — decades even — for other countries to wrest leadership on those issues from the United States.
On the key new transnational issues — financial stability, climate change, pandemics, terrorism and cyber strife — American leadership will be important, but success in the years ahead cannot be one-sided. Achieving our goals in the 21st century will require the cooperation of other nations, both friendly and not. In this sense, power becomes a positive-sum game. If the American century is to continue, it will not be enough to think in terms of American power over others. One must also think in terms of power to accomplish joint goals — goals that will involve sharing power with others such as China, Europe, Japan, India, Brazil and so forth. On many transnational issues, empowering others can help the U.S. to accomplish its own goals. In this world, networks and connectedness become an important source of our power. The United States is involved in more alliances and networks than any other country.
Contrary to those who proclaim this the “Chinese century,” we have not entered a “post-American world.” Yet the continuation of our American century will not look like our strengths of the 20th century. Our share of the world economy will be less than it was in the middle of the past century, and the complexity represented by the rise of other countries — as well as the increased role of nonstate actors — will make it more difficult for anyone to wield influence and organize action. We should stop using clichés about “uni-polarity” and “multi-polarity.” We will have to live with both situations at the same time. And we should stop talking and worrying about “decline,” a fear that mixes many different trends and leads to mistaken policy conclusions.
Instead, we must focus on what we can do well: With slightly less relative power in the midst of a much more complex world, the United States will need to make smart strategic choices both at home and abroad if we wish to maintain our leadership. [JB - this vapid statement reminds me of a line straight out of "Being There" with Peter Sellers]
The American century will continue for at least a number of decades or more; it will simply look very different than it did when Henry Luce first articulated it.
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The American century will continue for at least a number of decades or more; it will simply look very different than it did when Henry Luce first articulated it.
Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/american-century-will-continue-but-it-wont-look-same-118074.html#ixzz3aakw8KBf
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