Nationalism and legitimation for authoritarianism: A comparison of Nicholas I and Vladimir Putin
- DOI: 10.1016/j.euras.2013.11.001
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- Open Access funded by Hanyang University
Abstract
This article draws parallels between Tsar Nicholas I and current Russian President Vladimir Putin with respect to their use of nationalism to justify statist policies and political authoritarianism. Building upon insights by Alexander Gerschenkron about the economic development of “backwards” states, it argues that both Nicholas and Putin have rhetorically used Western concepts such as nationalism and democracy to legitimize their rule but have modified them to give them more statist content. Under Nicholas, this was exemplified in the tripartite (Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality) Official Nationality policy. Putin has emphasized patriotism, power, and statism to justify centralization of power and authoritarian policies. Putin's policies and rhetoric are strong analogs to those of Nicholas. Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to explain state-inspired Russian nationalism and how it has been aligned with authoritarian politics, as well as specifying similarities between present and past in Russia. ...
In comparing Vladimir Putin to Nicholas I, this paper gives substance to more generic comparisons between past and contemporary Russian leaders as well as demonstrating a pattern in the globalization of political thought. As ideas spread and norms begin to take root in civil society, governments cannot wholly ignore them. They are required to respond, lest they risk losing legitimacy and, consequently, influence and power. In the case of Russia, a country that has traditionally had to play catch-up with the fore-bearers of modernity, Western norms have espoused political liberalization and subsequently challenged the very nature of Russian political rule. Popular sovereignty in the form of national will, as spread by the Napoleonic conquests, came to disrupt the fabric of Russian society at the dawn of Nicholas I's reign. Similarly, popular sovereignty in the form of democratic representation came to be perceived as a threat to the unity and stability of the Russian Federation at the beginning of Vladimir Putin's presidency. In both cases, the head of state, operating within the rhetorical parameters of the norms they were deflating, reconfigured notions of popular sovereignty to inhibit the growth of civil society, thereby protecting their roles as the center of the state, and the state's role as the center of society. Both Nicholas and Putin were able to do this, in part, because of the “advantage of backwardness” that allowed them to see how these norms might develop and take hold before it happened in Russia.
In this way, the Russian state has been able to distract its citizens from the undemocratic nature of Russian society by equating Russianness with love, respect, and the need for authority. However, there is no guarantee that such a strategy will be successful in the long run. In the case of Nicholas I, his statist approach, justified on grounds of stability and modernization, was found wanting given Russia's defeat in the Crimean War. This debacle in turn spurred a series of more liberal reforms (e.g. repeal of serfdom) under Alexander II. Today Putin's statist policies are coupled with rhetoric about the need for modernization. However, as seen during the 2011 and 2012 election campaigns, the Russian people have begun to express discontent en masse with politics-as-usual and argue that genuine modernization will require more political liberalization and freedom for civil society. During his first two terms as president, Putin was able to fend off threats ‘from below’ in Russian society and build his popularity by contrasting his rule with the chaos of the Yeltsin years and with the help of systemic factors such as high oil prices. However, it is debatable if he can now easily co-opt or repress the protests led by younger, middle-class Russians who are aware that in political terms their country is well out of step with international norms of democratic practice. Put somewhat differently, Putin’s statist approach contains self-contradictions, as the ability of a corrupt Russian state to deliver reform and modernization can easily be doubted. If and when the bubble that has sustained Putin to date pops, like with the Crimean war that coincided with the end of Nicholas' reign, Putin may come to regret the lack of democratic and sustainable reform that characterizes his leadership.
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