Options for Ukraine

[JB note: I share the below 2005 piece on "options for Ukraine." I share it with reluctance (including updated comments, for concern it might be misunderstood as being "anti-Ukrainian").]

Among many others throughout the world, I am an admirer of the people of various "ethnicities" in the part of the world cited in the subject line, including its great writers.

Gogol' image from

I indeed had the privilege of helping to establish, as an American diplomat posted in Kyiv (93-95), the first (and then only) "America House" in the former USSR.

The purpose of the America House -- as I understood it from my employer, the defunct USIA -- was to share ideas on important bilateral matters, on not just "official" issues, between citizens from different parts of the world.

The America House was quickly (quietly?) shut down a few years after its establishment, apparently for financial reasons; thanks to the taxpayer it has recently been relocated/upgraded by the USG.

Via a kind researcher

As I look back on my Foreign Service career (I left the State Department in opposition to the planned war in Iraq), I think that one of my achievements in Kiev as a "Public Affairs" officer (again, 93-95) was to help implement the State Department policy that the former Ukraine SSR should free itself of its nuclear weapons, despite strong opposition from some elite members of that newly "independent" entity (among them those determining "public opinion") -- and from an eccentric U.S. academic. 

(Indeed, I personally thought then, perhaps naively, that a "smart PR" move for the former SSR Ukraine would have been for its government -- in its own national interest -- to declare itself a European nuclear-weapons free zone).

True, some would say that if Poroshenko could press the nuclear button, the world would be better off. But I'm not sure Poles or Balts would agree with this, not to say of persons living in the Ukrainian space themselves. (I was posted in Krakow, Poland [86-90] when the Chernobyl disaster occurred; the US Consulate was flooded with queries how to handle this tragedy in a neighboring area).

As a historian, I realize the immense costs and sufferings to populations due to the endless partitions of the continent by the Old World's self-interested great powers.

On the other hand, from a historical perspective, the idea of "permanent borders" in Europe is a myth, even if sanctioned by "international law," regrettably used (misused?) so often (but not always) to advance narrow national interests of the establishment powerful.

Throughout the centuries, "Europe" has evolved, for better or for worse, geographically (more than Africa?). 

Take, as a recent example, the U.S. support for the dismemberment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia -- or, in a more civilized fashion, the relatively gentle, self-determined divorce between "Czech" and "Slovak" areas of the former Czechoslovakia (I served in zlatá Praha, 83-85), which led to the dismemberment of an arguably artificial state. It occurred with -- above all -- no bloodshed, and arguably a better life for the population involved.

And did not we Americans, in fact, secede from the British Empire in 1776?

I realize that times have changed, and that in our new century a Ukrainian "national consciousness" has developed (especially, I surmise from press reports, among young, "Europeanized" Ukrainians) in large part as a result of aggressive, unjustifiably stupid Putin military actions in one of the more remote eastern areas of Europe, so-called Novorossiya. 

Most Americans cannot tell Ukraine on a map - and I'll bet most Europeans can't either (especially Новоро́ссия).

A Ukrainian "national consciousness," while arguably anachronistic in a globalized world, could lead to a viable form of a real Ukrainian rissorgimento (but remember the words of Garibaldi: "Abbiamo fatto l'Italia, ora dobbiamo fare gli italiani.")

One suggestion for those who admire (as I do) the exceptional inhabitants of a former Soviet space: Geographically bigger is not necessarily better. Consider Switzerland.

Given recent events, including the bloody ones in Zakarpattia (possibly instigated by Putin's secret service -- but I have no evidence of this), I remain perhaps overly skeptical on how the currently configured Ukrainian "unitary" state - broke, corrupt (numerous links -- too numerous to cite here), and unproductive/unjust on how it deals with its citizens -- will contribute to the well-being of the tough, talented, and admirable/amiable people inhabiting this crucial European space.

Of course, the temptation of the current Ukrainian governmental "structure" is to "blame the invaders." Not that the invaders, brutal idiots, themselves are off the hook.

Every people have the government they deserve. In the case of the courageous people surviving in a tormented, all too often forgotten borderland of Europe, I simply would not agree.

Bring in Gogol', if black humor is still possible in one of the bloodlands of Europe, whose sufferings are now sadly renewed in a supposedly more "enlightened" century. 

A propos of the potential mess in Odessa (to be solved, supposedly by, of all people, a Georgian ex-president, accused, rightly or not, of corruption in his homeland) -- Odessa being one of the more charming, cosmopolitan cities in Europe (despite its current decay) -- this just in].

John Brown, fpif.org

Options for Ukraine (2005)

The Ukraine should seriously consider the option of working with all parties involved in its current crisis–including the European Union, Russia, and the United States–in taking possible steps toward its nonviolent dismemberment in a manner acceptable to its variegated population.

The tense political situation in Ukraine may find a peaceful solution. But, at this critical juncture, efforts to maintain Ukraine as currently configured could turn out to be dangerously counterproductive. Ukraine should therefore seriously consider the option of working with all parties involved in its current crisis–including the European Union, Russia, and the United States–in taking possible steps toward its nonviolent dismemberment in a manner acceptable to its variegated population. The possibility of such a peaceful, democratic, and internationally acceptable geographical rearrangement of Ukraine should at least be put on the table before it is too late to prevent an unpredictable situation from falling out of control from increased regional, ethnic, economic, cultural, and linguistic conflicts.

Ukraine as it exists today is a failed state for several reasons. First, since its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has not succeeded in significantly improving the well-being of its population. Second, its ingrained political structures have not allowed democracy and a free press to develop. Third, as recent events demonstrate, it has clearly proved incapable of bridging the complex divide between its Russian-oriented, Orthodox eastern part and its westward-looking, Catholic area. Ukraine’s most significant achievement in the past decade was to dispose of its nuclear missiles, but this did more to ease tensions with Russia and the United States than to ameliorate the lives its ordinary citizens.

Regrettably, changing the ruling regime in Ukraine to a more European-oriented, democratic one is unlikely to provide a satisfactory, long-term solution to its enormous endemic problems. These stem in large part from the fact that the area, as a former Soviet republic with nearly 50 million people, is essentially a geopolitical construction of the USSR, not a country with sufficient national identity or self-governing experience in its history to develop as a viable economic and political entity. Ukrainian émigré nationalists will disagree with this view, but they cannot ignore the fact that prior to 1991 Ukraine–the name in its original meaning means borderland–in its entire past was “independent” for only a very short period after World War I. And it certainly was never a model of democracy, even if the Cossacks of the region earned a reputation for disregarding authority.

There are two options for the next ruling party in Ukraine. The leadership–be it composed of the current opposition or those struggling to remain in power–can try to keep the country geographically as it is. Perhaps this is possible, and provides the comforting panacea of not rocking the boat, on the surface at least. But, from a longer-term perspective, preserving Ukraine as it is could increase tensions between its ethnic groups and regions, as demands for autonomy from Russian-speaking areas already suggest. Dangerously, maintaining Ukraine as one unit at all costs could lead to greater internal conflicts leading to a bloody, Balkans-like dissolution of the country–and possible Russian intervention ostensibly to protect ethnic-Russian areas. One must not forget that modern Ukraine is not foreign to civil war, having experienced a horrid one less than a hundred years ago. In such a situation, democratic and economic reform would be all but impossible.

A second option for the Ukrainian leadership, whatever its political colors, would be the Czech and Slovak solution. After the end of Communist rule Czechoslovakia’s parliament decided to split Czechoslovakia in two–the Czech Republic and Slovakia–for a range of reasons, many of which were far from noble. But not a shot was fired during the separation, and although the “velvet divorce” has not turned the two sections of the former country into economic miracles, it has prevented tensions between them. As separate entities capable of keeping track of their own individual needs, they should play a role in NATO and the European Union more beneficial to their local populations than as smaller parts of a larger “Czechoslovakia.”

There are no models for the future of Ukraine, only options. A peaceful division of the area would be a complicated, time-consuming process requiring extensive international involvement and patience. A reconfiguration process would face great challenges, including determining the exact nature of the new entities.

Three significant challenges would face such a process. One is to effectively discourage pre-21st century romantic notions of national identity. These images, often propagated by the Ukrainian diaspora, bear little resemblance to the country in which it does not live. This “long-distance nationalism” suggests that Ukraine as it now appears on the map is bound to play a unique role in world history because of its size and location. Two, Great-Russia imperialists, who hold expansionist illusions, would also have to be held in check. Finally, Poles who want a large buffer state between themselves and Russia would have to be reminded that the well-being of the people in Ukraine, not imaginary realpolitik, is what matters most.

If the tense political situation in Kiev gets worse and if the status quo–i.e., Ukraine as currently configured–is maintained, separatist political groups and nationalities could resort to violence. Given such dire possibilities, Ukrainian leaders should look beyond a priori concepts of how the continued existence of today’s Ukraine is in the best interests of its long-suffering population or international stability. All options, including the geopolitical reinvention of Ukraine itself, deserve consideration. This could lead to a real Ukraine –not the artificial prolongation of “the” Ukraine forced upon its people during Soviet times.

John Brown, a former Foreign Service officer, has served, among other places, in Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine and is a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus (online at www.fpif.org).