Could the South Have Won the War? Note for a lecture, "E Pluribus Unum? What Keeps the United States United

by Terry L. Jones
March 16, 2015 10:47 am, New York Times

Disunion follows the Civil War as it unfolded.

By March 1865, it was obvious to all but the most die­hard Confederates
that the South was going to lose the war. Whether that loss was inevitable is an
unanswerable question, but considering various “what if” scenarios has long
been a popular exercise among historians, novelists and Civil War buffs.

To explore that question, historians often use a concept known as
contingency: During the war, one action led to a particular outcome, but if a
different action had been taken it would have led to a different outcome. The
problem with each scenario, though, is that although superficially persuasive,
it collapses under the weight of contradictory facts.

Perhaps the most common scenario centers on the actions of Gen. Robert
E. Lee. Some modern historians have attributed the Confederate defeat to
Lee’s aggressiveness, implying that, if he had adopted a more defensive
strategy, or even carried out guerrilla warfare after Appomattox, perhaps Lee
could have held the North at bay until it tired of the conflict and sought a
negotiated settlement.

But was this really possible considering the expectations of the
Confederate people? Southerners were convinced they were superior soldiers
and expected their armies to defeat the enemy on the battlefield. Politically,
Lee could not have adopted a purely defensive strategy because the people
would not have stood for it. Nor was guerrilla warfare an option. Events in
Missouri, Tennessee and other areas where guerrillas operated during the war
clearly showed how such brutal warfare devastated entire regions and broke
down morale. There simply would not have been enough popular support to
sustain such a strategy for long.

Some argue that the Confederates could have won if they had held
Atlanta, Mobile, Ala., and the Shenandoah Valley beyond the 1864 election.
Northern voters, dispirited by the stalemate, would have elected George B.
McClellan president, and he would have bowed to the Democratic Party’s
peace faction and opened negotiations with the Confederates.

Such speculation, however, is not supported by historical fact. In his letter
accepting the Democratic nomination, McClellan clearly rejected the peace
plank. There seems little doubt McClellan would have continued to fight if he
became president, and the Union would still have eventually won. Also, a
defeated Lincoln would have had four months left in office to achieve victory
by launching winter campaigns. As it turned out, Gen. Ulysses S. Grant forced
Lee to surrender just over one month after the inauguration. If a lame­duck
Lincoln had adopted a more aggressive policy, Grant probably would have
forced an Appomattox­like surrender before McClellan ever took office.

Confederate defeat has also been blamed on King Cotton diplomacy. If the
Confederates had sent as much cotton as possible to Europe before the
blockade became effective instead of hording it to create a shortage, they could
have established lines of credit to purchase war material. This argument is
true, but it misses the point. While the Confederates did suffer severe
shortages by mid­war, they never lost a battle because of a lack of guns,
ammunition or other supplies. They did lose battles because of a lack of men,
and a broken­down railway system made it difficult to move troops and
materials to critical points. Cotton diplomacy would not have increased the
size of the rebel armies, and an increasingly effective Union blockade would
have prevented the importation of railroad iron and other supplies no matter
how much credit the Confederates accumulated overseas.

Another diplomatic “what if” concerns European intervention. In the fall
of 1862, Britain and France were prepared to extend diplomatic recognition to
the Confederacy and offer to mediate a peace, but they backed away when the
Union won the Battle of Antietam. In this scenario, if Lee had won the battle,
Britain and France would have recognized the Confederacy and secured a
peace ensuring Southern independence.

In reality, there is little likelihood the Europeans would have become
involved in the war. They had already extended belligerent status to the
Confederacy, which allowed it to purchase supplies and use European ports.
Diplomatic recognition would have enhanced the Southerners’ prestige — but
it would not have materially affected their ability to wage war.

And if the British had offered to mediate a peace, Lincoln certainly would
have rebuffed them. Then what? It’s unlikely Britain would have rushed to the
Confederates’ aid by breaking the blockade and provoking a war with the
Union. By late 1862, emancipation had become a Union goal, and the
abolitionist British people would never have supported their government
becoming militarily involved to defend slavery. British officials also had not
forgotten that American privateers devastated their merchant fleet in the War
of 1812. And there was no economic incentive for Britain to become a
Confederate ally, because the cotton shortage created by the blockade was
soon alleviated by cotton from Egypt and India — and the trade Britain
conducted with the Union far outweighed the value of Southern cotton.

Some historians have blamed the Confederate defeat on its strict
adherence to states’ rights and a failure to develop a strong sense of
nationalism. If the Southern people had been more successful in forming a
national identity, Jefferson Davis could have nationalized the railroads and
industry, and the governors would have cooperated more with Richmond. A
powerful central government and a stronger sense of national identity would
also have helped sustain morale when the war began to go badly. Instead, the
Southerners’ belief in states’ rights kept the governors at odds with the central
government, and the breakdown in civilian morale weakened the army by
causing more soldiers to desert.

But that assessment underestimates what the South managed to
accomplish. Rather than blaming the Confederates’ defeat on a lack of
nationalism, one should marvel that they maintained their government as long
as they did. From scratch, Southerners created a functioning constitutional
government and a formidable military that included 80 percent of the eligible
white males. The Confederates quickly developed a sense of nationalism in the
first year of war because they believed they had no choice but either to form a
separate nation or to face complete ruin. The string of victories in Virginia in
1861 and 1862 only increased this national pride. Even when the war began to
go badly and the enemy occupied large sections of the Confederacy, most
Southern whites were determined to fight on because they knew their homes
would be the next to feel the invaders’ wrath if they did not.

Slavery and racial views also played an important role in Confederate
nationalism. When the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, Southern
whites’ resolve strengthened because they realized if they lost the war, the very
cornerstone of their society would be destroyed. The sight of black soldiers
deep in the Confederate heartland outraged Southern whites, but in the war’s
last year those same Southerners were willing to enlist slaves to fight on their
side. Confederate emancipation would have been unthinkable earlier in the
conflict, but by 1865 many Southerners supported recruiting slaves as a way to
strengthen the army and win European recognition. To achieve independence,
they were willing to sacrifice the very thing they went to war to protect.
here are notable examples in history where a weaker people defeated a
stronger one. The American Revolution and the Vietnam War immediately
come to mind, but the Americans and North Vietnamese had the military
backing of the superpowers France and the Soviet Union, respectively. In
virtually all cases where a weaker people have prevailed, they had a greater
determination to win and were willing to fight for years and suffer horrendous
casualties to wear down the enemy.

The Confederacy had no such backing, and a credible argument can be
made that its defeat was inevitable from the beginning. What many fail to
recognize is that Northerners were just as committed to winning as the
Southerners. Some saw it as a war to free the slaves, while others fought to
ensure that their republican form of government survived. Northerners
believed that America was the world’s last great hope for democracy, and if the
South destroyed the Union by force, that light of liberty might be extinguished
forever. Lincoln once said the North must prove “that popular government is
not an absurdity. We must settle this question now, whether in a free
government the minority have the right to break up the government whenever
they choose. If we fail it will go far to prove the incapability of the people to
govern themselves.”

The South may have been fighting to preserve a way of life and to protect
its perceived constitutional rights, but so was the North. If the Southern
people kept fighting even after the devastating defeats at Gettysburg,
Vicksburg and Chattanooga, why should we not believe the North would have
kept on fighting even if the Confederates had won Gettysburg, Vicksburg and
Chattanooga? The fact is that both sides were equally brave and equally
dedicated to their cause. Commitment and morale being the same, the
stronger side prevailed.

Sources: Terry L. Jones, “The American Civil War.”
Terry L. Jones is a professor of history at the University of Louisiana,
Monroe and the author of several books on the Civil War.