President Vladimir Putin with Russia's defence minister Sergei Shoigu. Photograph: Alexei Druzhinin/AP
Tell me your Ukraine and I will tell you who you are. The Ukrainian crisis is a political Rorschach test, not just for individuals but also for states. What it reveals to us is not encouraging for the west. It turns out that Vladimir Putin has more admirers around the world than you might expect for someone using a neo-Soviet combination of violence and the big lie to dismember a neighbouring sovereign state. When I say admirers, I don't just mean the governments of Venezuela and Syria, two of his most vocal supporters. Russia's strongman garners tacit support, and even some quiet plaudits, from some of the world's most important emerging powers, starting with China and India.
During a recent visit to China I was frequently asked what was going on in Ukraine, and I kept asking in return about the Chinese attitude to it. Didn't a country which has so consistently defended the principle of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of existing states (be they the former Yugoslavia or Iraq), and which itself has a couple of prospective Crimeas (Tibet, Xinjiang), feel uneasy about Russia simply grabbing a chunk of a neighbouring country?
Well, came the reply, that was a slight concern, but Ukraine was a long way away – and, frankly speaking, the positives of the crisis outweighed the negatives for China. What's more, the United States would have another strategic distraction (after al-Qaida, Afghanistan and Iraq) to hinder its "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific region, and divert its attention from China. And, cold-shouldered by the west, Russia would be more dependent on a good relationship with Beijing. As for Ukraine – which already sells China higher-grade military equipment than Russia has been willing to share with its great Asian ally – its new authorities had already quietly assured the Chinese authorities that Beijing's failure to condemn the annexation of Crimea would not affect their future relations. What's not to like in all that?
Beside this realpolitik, I was told, there is also an emotional component. Chinese leaders such as Xi Jinping, who grew up under Chairman Mao, still instinctively warmed to the idea of another non-western leader standing up to the capitalist and imperialist west. "Xi likes Putin's Russia," said one well-informed observer. Chinese media commentary has become more cautious since Putin moved on from Crimea to stirring the pot in eastern Ukraine. China's nationalist paper Global Times, which last month spoke of "Crimea's return to Russia", now warns: "Ukraine's eastern region is different from the Crimea. Secession of the region from Ukraine strikes a direct blow to territorial integrity guaranteed by international law." (But then, Putin is not aiming at outright secession: just a Finlandised Greater Bosnia – a neutral country with a version of "federalism" so far-reaching that the eastern regions would become Bosnia-style entities, within a Russian sphere of influence.)
However, this growing concern did not apparently cool the warmth of the welcome given to the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, in Beijing on Tuesday. President Xi said that relations between China and Russia "are at their best" and have played "an irreplaceable role in maintaining world peace and stability". The Chinese foreign ministry pronounced China-Russia to be the "major-country relationship that boasts the richest contents, the highest level and the greatest strategic significance". Cry your eyes out, USA. And Beijing looks forward to welcoming Putin for a major summit next month.
It is not just China. A friend of mine has just returned from India. He notes that, with the likely success of Narendra Modi and the growth of India's own "crony capitalism", liberal Indian friends fear that the world's largest democracy may get its own version of Putinismo. In any case, so far India has in effect sided with Russia, not the west, over Ukraine. Last month Putin thanked India for its "restrained and objective" stance on Crimea.
India's postcolonial obsession with sovereignty, and resentment of any hint of western liberal imperialism, plays out – rather illogically – in support for a country that dramatically violated its neighbour's sovereignty. An Indian satirical magazine even suggested that Putin had been hired as "the chief strategic consultant for India in order to bring a once-and-for-all end to the Kashmir issue". Oh, and by the way, India gets a lot of its arms from Russia.
And it is not just India. Russia's two other partners in the so-called Brics group – Brazil and South Africa – both abstained on the UN general assembly resolution criticising the Crimea referendum. They also joined Russia in expressing "concern" at the Australian foreign minister's suggestion that Putin might be barred from attending a G20 summit in November. The Russian ambassador to South Africa expressed appreciation for its "balanced" attitude.
What the west faces here is the uncoiling of two giant springs. One, which has been extensively commented upon, is the coiled spring of Mother Russia's resentment at the way her empire has shrunk over the past 25 years – all the way back from the heart of Germany to the heart of Kievan Rus.
The other is the coiled spring of resentment at centuries of western colonial domination. This takes very different forms in different Brics countries and members of the G20. They certainly don't all have China's monolithic, relentless narrative of national humiliation since Britain's opium wars. But one way or another, they do share a strong and prickly concern for their own sovereignty, a resistance to North Americans and Europeans telling them what is good for them, and a certain instinctive glee, or schadenfreude, at seeing Uncle Sam (not to mention little John Bull) being poked in the eye by that pugnacious Russian. Viva Putinismo!
Obviously this is not the immediate issue in Ukraine, but it is another big vista opened up by the east European crisis. In this broader, geopolitical sense, take note: as we go deeper into the 21st century, there will be more Ukraines.
A Princeton PhD, was a U.S. diplomat for over 20 years, mostly in Central/Eastern Europe, and was promoted to the Senior Foreign Service in 1997. After leaving the State Department in order to express opposition to the planned invasion of Iraq, he taught courses at Georgetown University pertaining to the tension between propaganda and public diplomacy. For many years he shared ideas on the theme "E Pluribus Unum? What Keeps the United States United" with Eurasian/European delegates participating in the "Open World" program.
Brown’s articles have appeared in numerous publications. A recent piece is “Janus-Faced Public Diplomacy: Creel and Lippmann During the Great War” (published in Nontraditional U.S. Public Diplomacy: Past, Present, and Future).
He is the author (with S. Grant) of The Russian Empire and the USSR: A Guide to Manuscripts and Archival Materials in the United States. He also served as an editor/translator of a joint U.S.-Soviet publication, The Establishment of Russian-American Relations, 1765-1815.