Sunday, February 26, 2017

America’s Best Picture? All of Them - Note for a discussion, "E Pluribus Unum? What Keeps the United States United."


By PETER SUDERMAN FEB. 25, 2017, New York Times



















image from article



For years, the Academy Awards reliably recognized movies that attempted to capture
the sweep of the American idea — in earnest films like “Forrest Gump” and “Saving
Private Ryan” as well as more scorching efforts like “There Will Be Blood” — that
seemed to want to define the country, and its people, all at once.

If you wanted a shot at a best-­picture Oscar in that era, an ambitious statement
film that tried to tell Americans who they really are was a good bet.

But in this decade, the Oscars have turned inward, eschewing ambitious epics
and grand statements about the national character in favor of anxious self-­reflection,
bestowing the Academy’s highest honors on films like “The Artist” and “Argo” that
flattered Hollywood’s self­-image. True, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, a
handful of movies tried to channel the country’s mood (“The Wolf of Wall Street”
and “American Hustle”) or critique its historic self­-conception (“12 Years a Slave”).
But by and large, Hollywood went from examining the national character to
examining its own.

This year’s crop has some of that. A top contender, “La La Land,” a technically
proficient love letter to old Hollywood musicals, is set in Los Angeles, of course.

Yet the nine films nominated for the Academy’s highest honor manage to present a
vision not of the American identity, but of the variety of American identities — a
collage of very different American lives that, taken together, provide as strong a
sense of the American idea as any single movie ever has.

Start with “Fences,” which, along with “Moonlight” and “Hidden Figures,”
explores the black experience in America.

Denzel Washington’s stirring adaptation of August Wilson’s 1985 play about a
working-­class black family in Pittsburgh during the 1950s probably has the most to
say about the American character. Working from some of the same elements as
“Death of a Salesman,” it is blunt about the role of racial discrimination in postwar
America. Yet it is also a small-­scale affair about the struggles of family life set mostly
in a tiny back yard.

“Hidden Figures,” a true story about the contributions of black women to the
space program during the 1960s, plays like a perspective­-flipped version of “The
Right Stuff.” Both “Figures” and “Fences” are steeped in a kind of counter­-nostalgia
that re­examines postwar America in a more critical light.

No Oscar nominee this year is more intensely focused on the nuances and
complexities of individual identity than “Moonlight.” The most likely challenger to
“La La Land,” it follows its gay, black protagonist — first as a child, then as a
teenager and finally as a hardened young adult — as he struggles with self-actualization
and self-­acceptance. As Juan (Mahershala Ali), the drug dealer who
helps raise him, says early in the film: “At some point, you got to decide for yourself
who you’re going to be. Can’t let nobody make that decision for you.”

The line is the key to this year’s entire slate of best-­picture nominees, which are
built on depictions of specific people and places with cultures and cadences, and
accents and aesthetics, that define the characters as separate from the rest of the
country. [JB emphasis]

Another set of films examine class and culture in white America.

“La La Land” is both a throwback musical fueled by cinematic self-­reference and
a portrait of two urban, coastal strivers who pour themselves into their ideas and
ambitions, in part because they cling to a belief in the promise of a creatively and
economically fulfilling life.

That makes for a striking contrast with “Hell or High Water,” a taut neo-Western
thriller set against the economic struggles of small-­town Texas, where debt
is rampant and the population is dwindling. The movie follows two brothers who, in
an act of economic revenge, have decided to rob the bank that’s about to foreclose on
their family home. It’s a bleak, rural counterpoint to the colorful urban fantasia of
“La La Land”; one tells the story of working-­class men with nothing to lose, the other
the story of creative professionals with everything to gain.

Mel Gibson’s bloody, brutal World War II drama “Hacksaw Ridge” also nods to
classic Hollywood, with a romantic, earnest first hour. The film tells the true story of
the religiously motivated conscientious objector Desmond Doss’s battlefield
heroism, and it stands out in this year’s field for its unironic portrayal of individual
religious conviction.

All these films embrace cultural memory of a decidedly different flavor than
what’s on display in “Fences” and “Hidden Figures.”

In “La La Land,” Ryan Gosling plays Seb, a jazz fanatic obsessed with the
genre’s decline. He takes Mia (Emma Stone) to a jazz club, where he insists: “That’s
why you need to be in the space and see what’s at stake. This whole thing — it’s
dying.” For Seb, jazz isn’t just a kind of music. It’s a way of life, enacted in a
particular place, but it’s struggling to survive — much like the dusty Texas towns of
“Hell or High Water.”

The writer-­director Kenneth Lonergan’s “Manchester By the Sea” is another
film defined by both a deep sense of place and a painful attachment to the past. Mr.
Lonergan’s portrait of mumbling, emotionally detached Northeastern working-­class
whites forced to deal with unbearable loss is a story about a distinctly individual
trauma, but also about how a community’s particular traits and habits can alter the
way that loss is felt.

Each of these movies, in other words, is about the struggle for individual and
cultural self­-definition — and the challenge of allowing for all those competing self-definitions
to flourish and coexist within some larger American community. They
are portraits of a nation fragmented by race, class, culture and geography.

Even the two I have yet to mention — “Lion” and “Arrival” — exist on the same
continuum. “Lion,” the only best-­picture nominee to be set entirely outside the
United States, is the true tale of an international adoptee’s search for his Indian
birthplace that deals with belonging and the pull of two very different cultures.

“Arrival” is a literary science­-fiction story about translating an alien language,
and in the process learning a new thought paradigm that staves off global war. It’s a
movie about learning to find peace in a dangerous world with others who don’t speak
or think like you.

Which is something like the challenge that America now faces. Perhaps more
than anything else, last year’s presidential race was fought over internal questions of
national identity as well as uneasiness about America’s place in the world. The
election did not resolve those questions so much as highlight the strength of
disagreement.

The narrow, personal focus of this year’s top Oscar nominees suggests how
tough it may be for Americans, or Hollywood, to settle on a single unifying vision of
what America means, or what it means to be an American. It may never again be
possible for one movie to fully answer those questions. More likely, it never was.

Yet this year’s best-­picture crop may have provided an answer — in the notion
that there is no one American story, but a variety of specific and unique American
stories, and in the idea that America is a nation of both individualism and pluralism.
You might think of the movies in the best-­picture category as a kind of expanded
cinematic universe — not of superheroes, but of ordinary, extraordinary lives,
overlapping and intersecting in a sprawling national epic too big for any one film.

Of course, that means the task is more difficult for moviegoers as well: If you
really want to find out what America looks like, you have to watch all of them.

Peter Suderman is the features editor at Reason Magazine and a pop culture columnist
at Vox.


Friday, February 24, 2017

Hell-icopter noise over the imperial capital ...

[The below JB e-mail message slightly edited for clarity]
Eastern Region Helicopter Council

Robert Grotell robert@planenoise.com

1:10 PM (5 hours ago)
to me
Dr. Brown,

Per our recent conversation, I contacted the Helicopter Association International who will be looking into your issue. I'll get back you with their findings.

Best regards,
Robert Grotell
Eastern Region Helicopter Council

Robert Grotell (robert@planenoise...17 more (15 Bcc)
Dear Mr. Grotell,

Thank you so much for getting back. Much appreciated. FYI, below a link on one of my blogs re the helicopters' noise.

The below blog entry (February 9, 2017) contains a copy of a 2015 letter, kindly provided by Congresswoman Norton's office (Ms. Dudley, copied on this message), that was sent under the Congresswoman's signature to the FAA Administrator re 'copter noise over Washington D.C.


My above blog entry on the 'copter noise thus far has gotten 353 "hits." Granted, not an impressive statistic by mass social media standards, but not to be ignored given that the "guilty" person responsible for this blog (yours truly, with his low name recognition, is not exactly a "front-page" personality).

Far more importantly, the considerable grassroots reactions re DC 'copter noise as indicated by the hundreds of persons who clicked on the above blog entry suggest how many citizens of our city treasure the relative "peace and quiet" of our neighborhoods -- and who do hope to be spared of eardrum-crushing hell-icopter fracas.

And perhaps even more importantly, what are these intruding thunderous retro flying machine overflights over ordinary citizens' homes actually doing/achieving in the 21st-century? 

With best wishes, and thank you again for your professionalism/concern, John Brown 202-363-7208

FYI. My efforts to reach the FAA directly by telephone re the DC 'copter noise have thus far led to a recorded-messages dead-end.

robert@planenoise.com robert@planenoise.com

2:49 PM (33 minutes ago)
to me
Thank you for your email. I'm currently out of the office and will be returning on Monday, March 5th.

For urgent matters, please email Evelyn Fazio at evelyn@planenoise.com. Otherwise, I'll respond to voicemails and emails as soon as possible upon my return. Thank you.

Best regards,



Send
Saved

What’s Left of Communism


David Priestland, New York Times, Feb. 24, 2017

Image from article, with caption: Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in Red Square, Moscow 1918

A hundred years after the Russian Revolution, can a phoenix rise 
from the ash heap of history?


Oxford, England — “Ura! Ura! Ura!” I vividly remember the wall of sound as stern,
gray-­uniformed soldiers met their commander’s greeting: “Congratulations on the
70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution!”

An exchange student in Moscow in 1987, I had traveled to Gorky Street on that
crisp November morning to see the military parade making its way to Red Square. A
row of assembled Soviet and foreign dignitaries presided as the young servicemen
paid homage at Lenin’s Mausoleum. This impressive­-seeming display was to
showcase the enduring revolutionary energy of Communism and its global reach.

The Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, spoke of a movement reinvigorated by
the values of 1917 before an audience of left­-wing leaders that included Oliver Tambo
of the African National Congress and Yasir Arafat of the Palestine Liberation
Organization. Banners bore the poet Vladimir Mayakovsky’s proclamation “Lenin
lived, Lenin lives, Lenin will live forever!”

The claim had a hollow ring, for the economic problems of the U.S.S.R. were
evident to all, especially my Russian student friends, dependent on poorly
provisioned universities for food. Even so, the system still seemed as solid as the
mausoleum’s marble. I, like most observers, would not have believed that within two
years Communism would be crumbling, and within four, the Soviet Union would
itself have collapsed.

Soon, popular views of 1917 changed entirely: Unfettered markets seemed natural
and inevitable, while Communism appeared to have always been doomed to Leon
Trotsky’s “dustbin of history.” There might be challenges to the globalized liberal
order, but they would come from Islamism or China’s state capitalism, no longer a
discredited Marxism.

Today, as we mark the centenary of the February Revolution — prequel to the
November coup of Lenin’s Bolsheviks — history has turned again. China and Russia
both deploy symbols of their Communist heritage to strengthen an anti­-liberal
nationalism; in the West, confidence in free­-market capitalism has not recovered
from the financial crash of 2008, and new forces of the far right and activist left vie
for popularity. In America, the unexpected strength of the independent socialist
Bernie Sanders in last year’s Democratic race, and in Spain, the electoral gains of the
new Podemos party, led by a former Communist, are signs of some grass-­roots
resurgence on the left. In 2015 Britain, Marx and Engels’s 1848 classic, “The
Communist Manifesto,” was a best seller.

So did I witness Communism’s last hurrah that day in Moscow, or is a
Communism remodeled for the 21st century struggling to be born?

There are hints of an answer in this complex, century­-long epic, a narrative arc
full of false starts, near-­deaths and unpredicted revivals.

Take the life of Semyon Kanatchikov. The son of a former serf, he left rural
poverty for a factory job and the thrill of modernity. Energetic and sociable,
Kanatchikov set out to improve himself with “The Self­-Teacher of Dance and Good
Manners” as his guide. Once in Moscow, he joined a socialist discussion circle, and
ultimately the Bolshevik party.

Kanatchikov’s experience made him receptive to revolutionary ideas: a keen
awareness of the gulf between rich and poor, a sense that an old order was blocking
the rise of the new, and a hatred of arbitrary power. Communists offered clear­-cut,
convincing solutions. Unlike liberals, they championed economic equality; but
unlike anarchists, they embraced modern industry and state planning; and against
moderate socialists, they argued that change must come through revolutionary class
struggle.

In practice, these ideals were difficult to combine. An over-­powerful state
tended to stifle growth while elevating new elites, and the violence of revolution
brought with it periodic hunts for “enemies.” Kanatchikov, too, became a victim.
Though awarded prestigious appointments after the revolution, his association with
Stalin’s archrival, Trotsky, brought about his demotion in 1926.

By then, the outlook for Communism was grim. The first flames of revolution in
Central Europe in the aftermath of World War I had been extinguished. The U.S.S.R.
found itself isolated, and Communist parties elsewhere were small and beleaguered.
The American­-forged modernity of the Roaring Twenties was unapologetically
consumerist, not communist.

But the flaws of laissez-­faire soon came to Communism’s rescue. The Wall
Street crash of 1929 and the Depression that followed made socialist ideas of
equality and state planning a compelling alternative to the invisible hand of the
market. Communist militancy also emerged as one of the few political forces
prepared to resist the threat of fascism.

Even the unpromising terrain of the United States, uncongenial to collectivism
and godless socialism, became fertile ground. Aided by Moscow’s abandonment in
1935 of its sectarian doctrine for a policy of supporting “popular fronts,” American
Communists made common cause with moderate leftists against fascism. Al
Richmond, a New York journalist at The Daily Worker, recalled the new optimism as
he and his colleagues spent evenings in an Italian restaurant drinking toasts “to life
as it was just then, to that era, to its portents and hopes, sure of our responses to the
rhythm of this time, for in it we heard our own beat.”

Such optimism was shared by a select group. A victim of Stalin’s purges,
Semyon Kanatchikov died in the gulag in 1940.

Many were willing to overlook Stalin’s Terror for the sake of anti­-fascist unity.
But Communism’s second coming in the late ’30s and early ’40s did not long outlast
the defeat of fascism. As the Cold War intensified, Communism’s identification with
Soviet empire in Eastern Europe compromised its claim to be a liberator. In Western
Europe, a reformed, regulated capitalism, encouraged by the United States, provided
higher living standards and welfare states. Command economies that made sense in
wartime were less suited to peace.

But if Communism was waning in the global North, in the South it waxed.
There, Communists’ promises of rapid, state­-led modernization captured the
imagination of many anti-colonial nationalists. It was here that a third red wave
swelled, breaking in East Asia in the 1940s and across the post­colonial South from
the late 1960s.

For Geng Changsuo, a Chinese visitor to a model collective farm in Ukraine in
1952 — three years after Mao Zedong’s Communist guerrillas entered Beijing — the
legacy of 1917 was still potent. A sober peasant leader from Wugong, a village about
120 miles south of Beijing, he was transformed by his trip. Back home, he shaved his
beard and mustache, donned Western clothes and evangelized for agricultural
collectivization and the miraculous tractor.

Revolutionary China only strengthened Washington’s determination to contain
Communism. But as America fought its disastrous war in Vietnam, a new generation
of Marxist nationalists emerged in the South, attacking the “neo-­imperialism” they
believed their moderate socialist elders had tolerated. The Cuban-­sponsored
Tricontinental Conference of African, Latin American and Asian socialists in 1966
introduced a new wave of revolutions; by 1980, Marxist­-Leninist states extended
from Afghanistan to Angola, South Yemen to Somalia.

The West also saw a Marxist revival in the ’60s, but its student radicals were
ultimately more committed to individual autonomy, democracy in everyday life and
cosmopolitanism than to Leninist discipline, class struggle and state power. The
career of the German student firebrand Joschka Fischer is a striking example. A
member of a group named Revolutionary Struggle who tried to inspire a Communist
uprising among autoworkers in 1971, he later became a leader of the German Green
Party.

The emergence from the late ’70s of an American­-led order dominated by global
markets, followed by the fall of Soviet Communism in the late ’80s, caused a crisis
for the radical left everywhere. Mr. Fischer, like many other 1960s students, adapted
to the new world: As German foreign minister, he supported the 1999 American
bombing over Kosovo (against the forces of the former Communist Serbian leader
Slobodan Milosevic), and he backed Germany’s welfare cuts in 2003.

In the South, the International Monetary Fund forced market reforms on
indebted post­-Communist countries, and some former Communist elites proved
eager converts to neoliberalism. Only a handful of nominally Communist states now
remain: North Korea and Cuba, and the more capitalist China, Vietnam and Laos.

Today, more than a quarter­-century after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., is a fourth
incarnation of Communism possible?

One major obstacle is the post-­’60s split between an old left that prioritizes
economic equality and the heirs of Mr. Fischer, who stress cosmopolitan values,
gender politics and multiculturalism. Moreover, championing the interests of the
underprivileged on a global scale seems an almost impossible task. The 2008 crash
only intensified the left’s dilemma, creating an opportunity for radical nationalists
like Donald J. Trump and Marine Le Pen to exploit anger at economic inequality in
the global North.

We are only at the beginning of a period of major economic change and social
turmoil. As a highly unequal tech-­capitalism fails to provide enough decently paid
jobs, the young may adopt a more radical economic agenda. A new left might then
succeed in uniting the losers, both white­-collar and blue-­collar, in the new economic
order. Already, we’re seeing demands for a more redistributive state. Ideas like the
universal basic income, which the Netherlands and Finland are experimenting with,
are close in spirit to Marx’s vision of Communism’s ability to supply the wants of all
— “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.”

This is all a long way from Moscow’s Red Square in 1987, even farther from
Petrograd’s Winter Palace in 1917. There will be no return to the Communism of
five-­year plans and gulags. Yet if there is one thing this turbulent history teaches us,
it is that “last hurrahs” can be as illusory as the “end of ideology” predicted in the
1950s or Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” of 1989.

Lenin no longer lives, the old Communism may be dead, but the sense of
injustice that animated them is very much alive.

David Priestland, a professor of modern history at Oxford University, is the author of
“The Red Flag: A History of Communism.”

Thursday, February 23, 2017

An interesting video on Propaganda and the Nazi film Triumph of the Will (via BM)


image from

See also (1) (2) (3).

Tomgram: Andrew Bacevich, At the Altar of American Greatness - Note for a discussion, "E Pluribus Unum? What Keeps the United States United."


tomdispatch.com

Image (not from article) from, under the headline: "‘Babes for Trump’ Want to Break the Internet"

The members of what TomDispatch regular Andrew Bacevich, author of America’s War for the Greater Middle East, calls “the Church of America the Redeemer” are in some disarray these days and in quite an uproar over the new Pope and his aberrant set of cardinals now ensconced in Washington. Perhaps there was no more striking -- or shocking -- evidence of that than the brief comments that hit the front page of the New York Times last week in an article on a month of “turmoil” in the Trump White House, but never became a headline story nationally. Amid the hurricane of news about the fall of national security adviser of 24 days Michael Flynn, the reported contacts of Trump associates with Russia, and a flurry of leaks to major papers from what are assumedly significant figures in the intelligence community (talk about "feud"!), one thing should have stood out. Here’s the passage from that Times piece: "Gen. Tony Thomas, head of the military’s Special Operations Command, expressed concern about upheaval inside the White House. 'Our government continues to be in unbelievable turmoil. I hope they sort it out soon because we’re a nation at war,' he said at a military conference on Tuesday. Asked about his comments later, General Thomas said in a brief interview, 'As a commander, I’m concerned our government be as stable as possible.'”
It may not have looked like much, but it should have stunned the news media and the country. That it didn’t tells us a great deal about how the U.S. has changed since September 11, 2001.  Thomas, the head of the crème de la crème, secretive military force (all 70,000 of them) cocooned inside the U.S. military, had just broken the unwritten rules of the American political game in a major way. He fired what amounted to an implicit warning shot across the bow of the Trump administration's listing ship of state: Mr. President, we are at war and you better get your house in order fast. Really? Direct public criticism of the president from a top commander in a military once renowned for its commitment to staying above the political fray?  Consider that something new under the sun and evidence that what might once have been considered a cliché -- sooner or later wars always come home -- is now an ever more realistic description of just where we’ve ended up 15-plus years after the Bush administration launched the war on terror. Seven days in May?  Maybe not, but when the nation's top special warrior starts worrying in public about whether civilian leaders are up to the task of governing, it's no ordinary day in February.
It’s true, of course, that in many graphic ways -- including the migration of spying devices developed on this country's distant battlefields to police departments here, drone surveillance flights not in Afghanistan but over this country, and the increasing militarization of our police -- our wars in the Greater Middle East have indeed made their way back to “the homeland.”  Still, not like this, not directly into the sacrosanct heartland of democracy and of the political elite, into what Bacevich might call the precincts of the American political Vatican, where those like New York Times columnist David Brooks once happily opined about American “greatness.” It seems that we’re now plunged into the political equivalent of war in the nation’s capital, even if in the fog of battle it’s still a little hard to tell just who is who on that battlefield. Tom
Angst in the Church of America the Redeemer 
David Brooks on Making America Great AgainBy Andrew J. Bacevich
Apart from being a police officer, firefighter, or soldier engaged in one of this nation’s endless wars, writing a column for a major American newspaper has got to be one of the toughest and most unforgiving jobs there is.  The pay may be decent (at least if your gig is with one of the major papers in New York or Washington), but the pressures to perform on cue are undoubtedly relentless.
Anyone who has ever tried cramming a coherent and ostensibly insightful argument into a mere 750 words knows what I’m talking about.  Writing op-eds does not perhaps qualify as high art.  Yet, like tying flies or knitting sweaters, it requires no small amount of skill.  Performing the trick week in and week out without too obviously recycling the same ideas over and over again -- or at least while disguising repetitions and concealing inconsistencies -- requires notable gifts.
David Brooks of the New York Times is a gifted columnist.  Among contemporary journalists, he is our Walter Lippmann, the closest thing we have to an establishment-approved public intellectual.  As was the case with Lippmann, Brooks works hard to suppress the temptation to rant.  He shuns raw partisanship.  In his frequent radio and television appearances, he speaks in measured tones.  Dry humor and ironic references abound.  And like Lippmann, when circumstances change, he makes at least a show of adjusting his views accordingly.

For all that, Brooks remains an ideologue.  In his columns, and even more so in his weekly appearances on NPR and PBS, he plays the role of the thoughtful, non-screaming conservative, his very presence affirming the ideological balance that, until November 8th of last year, was a prized hallmark of “respectable” journalism.  Just as that balance always involved considerable posturing, so, too, with the ostensible conservatism of David Brooks: it’s an act.
Praying at the Altar of American Greatness
In terms of confessional fealty, his true allegiance is not to conservatism as such, but to the Church of America the Redeemer.  This is a virtual congregation, albeit one possessing many of the attributes of a more traditional religion.  The Church has its own Holy Scripture, authenticated on July 4, 1776, at a gathering of 56 prophets.  And it has its own saints, prominent among them the Good Thomas Jefferson, chief author of the sacred text (not the Bad Thomas Jefferson who owned and impregnated slaves); Abraham Lincoln, who freed said slaves and thereby suffered martyrdom (on Good Friday no less); and, of course, the duly canonized figures most credited with saving the world itself from evil: Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, their status akin to that of saints Peter and Paul in Christianity.  The Church of America the Redeemer even has its own Jerusalem, located on the banks of the Potomac, and its own hierarchy, its members situated nearby in High Temples of varying architectural distinction.
This ecumenical enterprise does not prize theological rigor. When it comes to shalts and shalt nots, it tends to be flexible, if not altogether squishy. It demands of the faithful just one thing: a fervent belief in America’s mission to remake the world in its own image. Although in times of crisis Brooks has occasionally gone a bit wobbly, he remains at heart a true believer. 
In a March 1997 piece for The Weekly Standard, his then-employer, he summarized his credo.  Entitled “A Return to National Greatness,” the essay opened with a glowing tribute to the Library of Congress and, in particular, to the building completed precisely a century earlier to house its many books and artifacts.  According to Brooks, the structure itself embodied the aspirations defining America’s enduring purpose.  He called particular attention to the dome above the main reading room decorated with a dozen “monumental figures” representing the advance of civilization and culminating in a figure representing America itself.  Contemplating the imagery, Brooks rhapsodized:
“The theory of history depicted in this mural gave America impressive historical roots, a spiritual connection to the centuries. And it assigned a specific historic role to America as the latest successor to Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome. In the procession of civilization, certain nations rise up to make extraordinary contributions... At the dawn of the 20th century, America was to take its turn at global supremacy.  It was America's task to take the grandeur of past civilizations, modernize it, and democratize it.  This common destiny would unify diverse Americans and give them a great national purpose.”[JB emphasis]
This February, 20 years later, in a column with an identical title, but this time appearing in the pages of his present employer, the New York Times, Brooks revisited this theme.  Again, he began with a paean to the Library of Congress and its spectacular dome with its series of “monumental figures” that placed America “at the vanguard of the great human march of progress.”  For Brooks, those 12 allegorical figures convey a profound truth.
“America is the grateful inheritor of other people’s gifts.  It has a spiritual connection to all people in all places, but also an exceptional role.  America culminates history.  It advances a way of life and a democratic model that will provide people everywhere with dignity.  The things Americans do are not for themselves only, but for all mankind.”
In 1997, in the midst of the Clinton presidency, Brooks had written that “America’s mission was to advance civilization itself.”  In 2017, as Donald Trump gained entry into the Oval Office, he embellished and expanded that mission, describing a nation “assigned by providence to spread democracy and prosperity; to welcome the stranger; to be brother and sister to the whole human race.” 
Back in 1997, “a moment of world supremacy unlike any other,” Brooks had worried that his countrymen might not seize the opportunity that was presenting itself.  On the cusp of the twenty-first century, he worried that Americans had “discarded their pursuit of national greatness in just about every particular.”  The times called for a leader like Theodore Roosevelt, who wielded that classic “big stick” and undertook monster projects like the Panama Canal.  Yet Americans were stuck instead with Bill Clinton, a small-bore triangulator.  “We no longer look at history as a succession of golden ages,” Brooks lamented.  “And, save in the speeches of politicians who usually have no clue what they are talking about,” America was no longer fulfilling its “special role as the vanguard of civilization.”
By early 2017, with Donald Trump in the White House and Steve Bannon whispering in his ear, matters had become worse still.  Americans had seemingly abandoned their calling outright.  “The Trump and Bannon anschluss has exposed the hollowness of our patriotism,” wrote Brooks, inserting the now-obligatory reference to Nazi Germany.  The November 2016 presidential election had “exposed how attenuated our vision of national greatness has become and how easy it was for Trump and Bannon to replace a youthful vision of American greatness with a reactionary, alien one.”  That vision now threatens to leave America as “just another nation, hunkered down in a fearful world.”
What exactly happened between 1997 and 2017, you might ask?  What occurred during that “moment of world supremacy” to reduce the United States from a nation summoned to redeem humankind to one hunkered down in fear?
Trust Brooks to have at hand a brow-furrowing explanation.  The fault, he explains, lies with an “educational system that doesn’t teach civilizational history or real American history but instead a shapeless multiculturalism,” as well as with “an intellectual culture that can’t imagine providence.”  Brooks blames “people on the left who are uncomfortable with patriotism and people on the right who are uncomfortable with the federal government that is necessary to lead our project.” 
An America that no longer believes in itself -- that’s the problem. In effect, Brooks revises Norma Desmond’s famous complaint about the movies, now repurposed to diagnose an ailing nation: it’s the politics that got small.
Nowhere does he consider the possibility that his formula for “national greatness” just might be so much hooey. Between 1997 and 2017, after all, egged on by people like David Brooks, Americans took a stab at “greatness,” with the execrable Donald Trump now numbering among the eventual results.
Invading Greatness
Say what you will about the shortcomings of the American educational system and the country’s intellectual culture, they had far less to do with creating Trump than did popular revulsion prompted by specific policies that Brooks, among others, enthusiastically promoted. Not that he is inclined to tally up the consequences. Only as a sort of postscript to his litany of contemporary American ailments does he refer even in passing to what he calls the “humiliations of Iraq.”
A great phrase, that. Yet much like, say, the “tragedy of Vietnam” or the “crisis of Watergate,” it conceals more than it reveals.  Here, in short, is a succinct historical reference that cries out for further explanation. It bursts at the seams with implications demanding to be unpacked, weighed, and scrutinized.  Brooks shrugs off Iraq as a minor embarrassment, the equivalent of having shown up at a dinner party wearing the wrong clothes.
Under the circumstances, it’s easy to forget that, back in 2003, he and other members of the Church of America the Redeemer devoutly supported the invasion of Iraq.  They welcomed war.  They urged it. They did so not because Saddam Hussein was uniquely evil -- although he was evil enough -- but because they saw in such a war the means for the United States to accomplish its salvific mission.  Toppling Saddam and transforming Iraq would provide the mechanism for affirming and renewing America’s “national greatness.”
Anyone daring to disagree with that proposition they denounced as craven or cowardly.  Writing at the time, Brooks disparaged those opposing the war as mere “marchers.” They were effete, pretentious, ineffective, and absurd.  “These people are always in the streets with their banners and puppets.  They march against the IMF and World Bank one day, and against whatever war happens to be going on the next... They just march against.”
Perhaps space constraints did not permit Brooks in his recent column to spell out the “humiliations” that resulted and that even today continue to accumulate.  Here in any event is a brief inventory of what that euphemism conceals: thousands of Americans needlessly killed; tens of thousands grievously wounded in body or spirit; trillions of dollars wasted; millions of Iraqis dead, injured, or displaced; this nation’s moral standing compromised by its resort to torture, kidnapping, assassination, and other perversions; a region thrown into chaos and threatened by radical terrorist entities like the Islamic State that U.S. military actions helped foster.  And now, if only as an oblique second-order bonus, we have Donald Trump’s elevation to the presidency to boot.
In refusing to reckon with the results of the war he once so ardently endorsed, Brooks is hardly alone.  Members of the Church of America the Redeemer, Democrats and Republicans alike, are demonstrably incapable of rendering an honest accounting of what their missionary efforts have yielded.
Brooks belongs, or once did, to the Church’s neoconservative branch. But liberals such as Bill Clinton, along with his secretary of state Madeleine Albright, were congregants in good standing, as were Barack Obama and his secretary of state Hillary Clinton.  So, too, are putative conservatives like Senators John McCainTed Cruz, and Marco Rubio, all of them subscribing to the belief in the singularity and indispensability of the United States as the chief engine of history, now and forever.
Back in April 2003, confident that the fall of Baghdad had ended the Iraq War, Brooks predicted that “no day will come when the enemies of this endeavor turn around and say, ‘We were wrong. Bush was right.’" Rather than admitting error, he continued, the war’s opponents “will just extend their forebodings into a more distant future.”
Yet it is the war’s proponents who, in the intervening years, have choked on admitting that they were wrong. Or when making such an admission, as did both John Kerry and Hillary Clinton while running for president, they write it off as an aberration, a momentary lapse in judgment of no particular significance, like having guessed wrong on a TV quiz show. 
Rather than requiring acts of contrition, the Church of America the Redeemer has long promulgated a doctrine of self-forgiveness, freely available to all adherents all the time. “You think our country’s so innocent?” the nation’s 45th president recently barked at a TV host who had the temerity to ask how he could have kind words for the likes of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Observers professed shock that a sitting president would openly question American innocence.
In fact, Trump’s response and the kerfuffle that ensued both missed the point. No serious person believes that the United States is “innocent.” Worshipers in the Church of America the Redeemer do firmly believe, however, that America’s transgressions, unlike those of other countries, don’t count against it. Once committed, such sins are simply to be set aside and then expunged, a process that allows American politicians and pundits to condemn a “killer” like Putin with a perfectly clear conscience while demanding that Donald Trump do the same.
What the Russian president has done in Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria qualifies as criminal. What American presidents have done in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya qualifies as incidental and, above all, beside the point.
Rather than confronting the havoc and bloodshed to which the United States has contributed, those who worship in the Church of America the Redeemer keep their eyes fixed on the far horizon and the work still to be done in aligning the world with American expectations. At least they would, were it not for the arrival at center stage of a manifestly false prophet who, in promising to “make America great again,” inverts all that “national greatness” is meant to signify.
For Brooks and his fellow believers, the call to “greatness” emanates from faraway precincts -- in the Middle East, East Asia, and Eastern Europe.  For Trump, the key to “greatness” lies in keeping faraway places and the people who live there as faraway as possible. Brooks et al. see a world that needs saving and believe that it’s America’s calling to do just that.  In Trump’s view, saving others is not a peculiarly American responsibility. Events beyond our borders matter only to the extent that they affect America’s well-being. Trump worships in the Church of America First, or at least pretends to do so in order to impress his followers.
That Donald Trump inhabits a universe of his own devising, constructed of carefully arranged alt-facts, is no doubt the case. Yet, in truth, much the same can be said of David Brooks and others sharing his view of a country providentially charged to serve as the “successor to Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome.” In fact, this conception of America’s purpose expresses not the intent of providence, which is inherently ambiguous, but their own arrogance and conceit. Out of that conceit comes much mischief. And in the wake of mischief come charlatans like Donald Trump. 
Andrew J. Bacevich, a TomDispatch regular, is the author of America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military Historynow out in paperback.